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PREFACE

Lowell Gudmundson is Assistant Professor of History and Associate
Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida
International University, His field research began in Costa Rica
in 1975, where he was assistant professor of history at the
Universidad Nacional (Heredia).
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Stabilization and Neutrality, 1983-1984"

The past year was one of uneasy stability for the Costa Rican economy,
with little in the way of political innovation or change internally.

In

foreign affairs, Costa Rica pulled back somewhat from its openly hostile
attitude toward the Sandinista regime, to the evident dismay and chagrin of
the Reagan administration and its Central American strategists.
these trends were all relative.

To be sure,

Economic stability could best be seen in

comparison with the utterly disastrous 1981-1982 experience of massive
devalu ation and runaway inflation.

Even so, unemployment remained high

through much of 1983 and there was a radical increase in the internal poverty
index since the crisis began in 1980, despite lowered inflation and exchange
rate stability during 1983.

These positive developments appeared to be owing

more to the local government's

ability to negotiate easier debt repayment

terms internationally, and obtain major aid monies from the United States,
than to its success with pro-export and import-restrictive policies at home.
Thus, the economic achievement of 1983, stabilization, may well be more of a
precarious holding action in the present strained circumstances than a longrange solution to the country's economic woes.
Costa Rican politics were at a low ebb in this the second year of the
administration of Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez (1982-1986), well over two years
in advance of the 1986 Presidential elections.

Perhaps only the Central

Committee "coup" which deposed the first and only (52 years tenure) Secretary
General of the pro-Soviet "Popular Vanguard Party," Manuel Mora Valverde, in
December 1983, led to a ripple in local political waters.

The majoritarian

parties, Liberaci6n Nacional and Unidad Social Cristiana (the 1978 "Unidad"
coalition reborn in 1984), began to witness the ritual of Presidential

2
precandidacies and rumors of same, with a view toward the serious campaigning
ahead this year and next.
Internationally, the Monge administration tilted toward the Contadora
group's

positions and away from its earlier warm relations with the Reagan

administration and its Central American policy.

This could be seen first in

the removal of the virulently anti-Sandinista Foreign Minister, Fernando Volio
Jimbnez, in November 1983, and subsequently in its much publicized "permanent
declaration of active neutrality" (see documents section).

Of greatest

practical significance, the government assumed a much more active role in the
interdiction

and

deportation

of

Edbn

Pastora's

Alianza

Revolucionaria

Democrfitica (ARDE) fighters, along with a number of foreign mercenaries in
transit.

This, combined with the end of the year rejection of a United States

offer of military "engineers" to build roads along the sensitive border with
Nicaragua, seemed to be sending a clear message to the U.S.-backed

anti-

Sandinista forces that Costa Rica would no longer go along with their openly
confrontationist strategies.

Relations with Nicaragua remained very strained

to be sure, but the Monge government appeared to be disassociating itself from
counterrevolutionary forces in the area, owing both to intraparty disputes
over earlier cooperation with such forces, and out of fear of the consequences
of a larger war on its border.
given the government's

How long this policy might be sustainable,

considerable financial dependence on

administration, is yet an open question.

the Reagan

Indeed, as this writing proceeds

(May 1984) yet another attempt is being made by the Reagan team to woo Costa
Rica away from its newly reaffirmed neutrality and toward the confrontationist
line of its Honduran and Salvadoran allies (see below for further details).
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COSTA RICA' S ECONOMIC DEBACLE
Costa Rica's

disastrous experience of 1981-1982 was the result of both

long term structural imbalances and short term, conjunctural problems and
misjudgments.

Symptomatic of the former were endemic deficit financing and

reliance on private and public capital inflows to cover balance of payments
shortfalls resulting from inflated consumer import bills, the proliferation of
poorly coordinated and

semi-autonomous public

institutions supported by

central government revenues, and the subsidizing of an inefficient and import
dependent local industry protected under Central American Common Market or
local tariff legislation.

The buildup of these structural tensions would have

eventually led to a crisis regardless of external, conjunctural trends.
However, the disastrous downturn in these conditions since the late 1970s led
to the explosive crisis situation of the recent past.

The generalization of

warfare throughout the Central American region both made a shambles of the
once prosperous Common Market trade network and frightened away any potential
foreign private investment capital.

Moveover, the post-1979 international

credit and interest rate spiral, along with generalized inflation, battered
the local economy mercilessly.

Add to this the inept and obstinate monetary

policy of the Carazo Odio administration (1978-1982) in resisting devaluation,
borrowing indiscriminately, and printing baseless currency as a last resort,
and the stage was set for disaster.

And the disaster would not be delayed, as

Carazo and his team desperately hoped, until a new administration might take
office.

In the face of an external debt which spiraled from $800 million in

1979 to over $4 billion in 1983, and deficit spending which reached some 17%
of gross domestic product in 1980, the economy collapsed along with the
exchange rate, beginning in late 1980.l

By March 1982 the national currency,

the colb, had declined from 8.6 to the dollar to 65, eventually stabilizing

after mid-1982 in the 45-50 range, an effective devaluation of some 500%.
Inflation during 1982 was officially pegged at 82%, but likely exceeded
100%.

From October/November 1981 to a like period of 1982 the gross domestic

product fell by some 11.5% and prospects appeared grim for the future. 2
Unemployment reached nearly ten percent by the end of 1982 and all payments
were suspended on the foreign debt from August 1981 to July 1982.
The Monge administration took office in May 1982 and began a process of
stabilization, the results of which are only now becoming clear.

Central to

the stabilization plan was the reestablishment of external creditworthiness,
first through partial resumption of debt servicing since July 1982 and, more
importantly, by means of a succession of International Monetary Fund (IMF)
agreements signed since December of that year.

Throughout 1983 Costa Rica was

able to keep itself generally within the IMF-imposed limits, thanks in no
small part to United States aid totaling some $350 million, of a total foreign
capital inflow of upwards of $500 million, compared to only $800 million in
export

revenue^.^

Prospects for continued economic stabilization, much less

recovery, appear to depend heavily upon both continued U.S. aid and compliance
with increasingly unpopular IMF guidelines.

While the "bitterness" of the

IMF-supplied medicine is clear, its effect upon the newly stable patient's
chances for recovery remains the subject of contention.
Stabilization meant

not only exchange rate stability but also an

inflation rate officially reported at 11% for 1983, a decline in the open
unemployment rate to some 5.5%,

and, for the first time in three or four

years, a nearly 1% increase in the gross national product.4

These figures

compare rather favorably with the 1982 figures of 82% inflation, 9.4%
unemployment, and -11% in GNP.

However, Costa Rita's slight increase in GNP,

to approximately $4.65 billion, came about despite the continued decline

light of the 500% devaluation.

Revenue from exports declined some 11.4% in

1982 and nearly 20% in 1983, to a paltry $800 million.

Even in their most

optimistic scenarios, officials foresee a return to 1980 export levels only
during 1984-1985 (about $1 billion per year).5
This poor export performance has been particulary worrisome to the Monge
administration planners who clearly envisoned the devaluation sparking a nontraditional export-led recovery.

Moreover, national industrial production was

particularly devestated, falling 7.5%

by value in 1982 and reflecting the

paralization of the Central American trade for which much of local industry
had produced.

The only industrial sector somewhat immune to the regional

depression were the U. S.-oriented

textile "draw-back" plants, employing some

15,000 workers with a capital investment of some 2.75 billion colones by
1982.~
The surprisingly negative export performance has confounded the new
administration's technocrats and has dashed their hopes for a rapid recovery
after a brief interlude of IMF-prescribed austerity.

Thus, political and

economic debate has refocused upon the question of how best to reactivate the
sluggish local economy.

No longer do the export-led proponents have the field

unopposed within the administration, and its ongoing relations with the IMF
reflect this.

While the IMF remains committed to austerity and export-led

solutions, local political groupings, including occasionally the president
himself, appear to be relying on a public sector injection of funds, whether
through deficit financing or external aid, to reactivate a lethargic local
economy whose

traditional agricultural exports face extremely

consumer markets abroad.

inelastic

This debate and policy oscillation has characterized

much of the post-stabilization period of 1983-1984.

BEYOND STABILIZATION: COSTA RICA'S TUG OF WAR WITH THE IMF
Even before President Monge signed the first letter of intent with the
IMF in December 1982, his administration had begun to test the fiscal limits
of the agreement.

The 1983 public sector budget deficit, as first envisoned

in the September 1982 outline, far exceeded the 4.5% of GNP allowed by the
IMF.
was

Whereas the IMF target for overall spending by the central government
18 billion colones, the first outline

billion.

contemplated

spending 22.3

Eventually the IMF guidelines were met, and then some, reducing

deficit spending as a percentage of GNP from 12%, assuming a 22 billion colbn
budget overall, to less than 2% (according to President Monge only 1.8 billion
colones beyond revenues were expended during 1 9 8 3 ) ~ ~This compared to levels
of 17% in 1980, 13% in 1981, and 9.5% in 1982.~ Moveover, the IMF further
pushed for a level of only 2% in 1984, while local officials considered 3% a
realis tic figure.
The IMF goals were achieved during 1983 by a progressive elimination of
pervasive consumer subsidies and by massive infusions of U.S.
multilateral credit bailouts.

aid and

Export revenues, however, continued to decline,

along with direct foreign private investment, and the administration's much
vaunted plan to eliminate 30,000 of the nearly 150,000 public sector jobs9
backfired as Monge actually added some 6,000 new jobs during the depth of the
1982-1983 crisis.''

Thus, stabilization came at the cost of some degree of

austerity, tempered by the good fortune of abundant external resources, but
both export performance and public sector staffing suggested that little
structural change had been effected.
Buoyed by this first semester respite from exchange rate and price
instability, and concerned with continued economic sluggishness, the Monge
administration presented at year's end a mammoth budget outline for the public

sector in 1984 of some 25 billion colones, perhaps 13-15 billion of which made
up the deficit.

These levels of spending would have represented 12.5% and up

to 7.5% of GNP,respectively, over twice the deficit level acceptable to the

IMF.'~

In some respects, this was a political ploy designed to placate public

sector political supporters and establish an aggressive bargaining position
vis-a-vis both the IMF and a National Assembly to be pressured to raise taxes
to close such an alarming deficit.

After lengthy consultations, the Monge

administration was able to pass a National Einergency Law, in March 1984,
designed to reduce the projected 13.5 billion col6n deficit to 5.5 billion,
well within IMF guidelines, through new taxes on imports and corporate income,
a forced contribution to the central government of 1.17 billion colones during
1984 by 18 public sector "autonomous" agencies, and such things as new tourist
and passport fees.

At the same time, 12 year income tax and import duty

exemptions were granted to non-traditional exporters. 12
Faced with Costa Rican recalcitrance, the IMF (and U. S .-AID)

twice

suspended funds (November 1983 and April 1984) pending compliance with its
guidelines.

In November the IMF wanted a 1% tax on foreign exchange

remittances replaced by a tax on imports, while in April it insisted upon a
15% increase in gasoline prices and the effective restriction of all foreign
exchange transactions to the Central Bank. l3

In addition, the IMF continued

to monitor public sector spending to insure compliance with the agreed upon
deficit

limits.

Of

particular

significance in

this

regard

was

the

administration's promise to begin paying some 500 million colones in salary
increases to the teachers' union in March 1984.14

Without solid sources to

finance this erogation, this was sure to breach the IMF deficit spending
limit.
Underlying this tug of war over public sector spending levels is an

increasingly pessimistic, and nationalistic, assessment of the economic
recovery on the part of the Monge administration's technocratic team.

Whereas

Minister of Exports Mario Carvajal had confidently predicted in early 1983
that exports would surge from $900 million in 1983 (they fdll short badly) to
over $1,500 million in 1986,15 by February 1984 he was joining with the new
Minister of National Planning, the economist Juan Manuel Villasuso, in
cautioning that there would be no substantial recovery during the Monge
presidency.16

The two officials argued that with export revenues stagnant at

about $1 billion or less per year (1984), barely able to cover the bill for
essential imports, part of the nearly $500 million in capital inflow being
used currently to service the foreign debt would have to be increased and/or
diverted to stimulating local economic growth.

IMF opposition to such public

sector "pump priming" was a virtual certainty, unless external aid monies
could be

increased accordingly.

The negative attitude of the Reagan

administration toward supporting public sector spending with foreign aid,
short of a local equivalent of the sort of defense buildup which justifies its
own deficits, would likely outdo that of the IMF.

That local planners should

have moved from the rose-tinged glasses view of an export-led economic rebound
to

pessimistic diagnoses and

interventionist policies

so quickly only

highlights what is likely to remain the focus of economic policy debates for
months if not years to come:

an IMF austerity-based recovery versus a return

to neo-keynesian public sector paliatives in the face of the former's
perceived high cost and limited short term success in improving the local
economy.

THE SOCIAL COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STABILIZATION
The immediate result of the economic debacle of 1981-1982 was the sudden

impoverishment of the vast majority of the Costa Rican population.

By early

1983 average industrial wages were on a par with Haiti, at a level of less
than $0.20 per hour, and fully 71% of families in January 1983 were found to
have incomes below the poverty level for basic food costs, much less able to
pay spiraling rentals.
1980.17

This compared with only 24.8% in 1977 and 41.7% in

As IMF stabilization policies took hold and subsidies were eliminated

this situation deteriorated even further.
During the first half of 1983 the only major conflict provoked by
constantly rising prices was a nationwide road blockade in response to massive
hikes in electricity and telephone rates.

In the face of an announced

increase (the third in 18 months) of 92% in electricity rates, large numbers
of people took to the streets in protest and forced the government to roll
back rates in June. l8

Curiously, spontaneous neighborhood direct action

strategies had succeeded where traditionally weak union or class-based popular
movements had failed in blunting the austerity measures.

San Josk's graffiti

artists rejoiced with the slogan "let the millionaires pay for the crisis."
Throughout the year, but particularly in its second half, land invasions,
occasionally involving armed confrontation, were the principal reactions of
both the urban and rural poor.

While the government distributes some food

assistance to perhaps 40,000 families1' direct action has traditionally been
the most effective means of solving the other major existential problem of the
poor:

lack of housing in the cities, and lack of tillable land in the

countryside.
The housing deficit in the greater metropolitan area of San Josh has
become legendary, with the government itself characterizing its urban areas as
11

national emergency disaster zones'' owing to their deficient infrastructure.

This is the case despite a relatively effective state housing authority

10
(Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanism0

-

INVU).

Part of the aggravation

of the housing situation was traceable to the 40% drop in construction
activity during the crisis of 1982 alone.2o

A University of Costa Rica and

Council of Science and Technology study estimated in 1983 that there was a
current national housing shortage of 130,000 units, with a further shortfall
of 125,000 units expected by 1990, when some 40% of the population would form
part of this "shortfall".21

In response to popular protests, which included a

January march through San Jos6 and several mass occupations of semi-urban lots
around the city, the Monge administration promised to build 10,000 new units
during 1983, at a cost of $31 million and hopefully with Mexican governmental
assistance.22

At this writing INVU was developing major new projects in the

traditional public housing areas of Pavas, west of the capital.
Land invasions in the countryside presented a more serious and dangerous
problem.

The Monge administration's campaign slogan had been a "return to the

land" and, as one local pundit sarcastically put it, private ranchers' barbed
wire presented a major obstacle to the program's

fullfillment.

Costa Rica's

land tenure system today is as highly inegalitarian as anywhere in Central
America.

Some 44,300 farms comprise only 124,000 hectares, while 11,500

larger farms monopolize over 2 million hectares.

The government's land reform

and colonization unit (now renamed the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario

-

IDA)

had only titled over land to some 16,000 farmers in 22 years, while over 9,000
cases were "pending for lack of resources. 1123
Traditionally, the central government responds most rapidly to peasantinitiated direct actions, usually non-violent occupation of disputed, or
simply coveted and uncultivated lands.

During 1983 several such occupations

caused bloody clashes with the police and led President Monge to push for
legislation, in ~ugust,to authorize the distribution of land to some 10,000

families.24

The occupations which provoked this move took place in March 1983

along the southern border region with Panama and led to the death of one and
the arrest of 300 of the 700 squatters involved.25

In July further violence

broke out in the region when 800 ex-employees of United Brands seized nine
company farms in the Coto Valley. 26

Already, in June, President Monge had

publicly expressed displeasure at the disorder reigning in the administration's

agrarian policy circles and he charged his Planning Minister to

investigate to determine why the "return to the land" program was not
working.

In the meantime, the Rural Guard police forces were ordered into the

fray, with the government responding favorably on an ad hoe basis, as has long
been its pattern, to squatters' direct action.
Public sector and urban industrial labor unions were extraordinarily
quiescent during 1983 and early 1984.

Marches and negotiations rarely led to

strikes, although one was threatened by the powerful 2,000 member Atlantic
Railroad Workers' Union, backed by the 10,000 members of the Limon Workers'
~
Federation, in February 1 9 8 4 . ~ More
important were the ongoing negotiations
between the public employees' unions, headed traditionally by the teachers'
unions,28 and the State over implementation of the agreed upon "sliding salary
scale" adjustments of wages, pending since September 1982.

This area promised

to be the focus of serious labor union conflict throughout the remainder of
1984,

Its resolution within the deficit spending limits will obviously be

critical for the Monge administration in its future dealings with the IMF and
international creditors.
Finally, Costa Rica continued to bear an additional cost of the crisis,
albeit Central American rather than local in this case.

During 1983 refugee

populations had swollen to include an estimated 3,000-5,000 Nicaraguans,
10,000 Salvadorans, 500 Guatemalans, and 900 Cubans , many in U*N*-su~~Orted

refugee camps such as the one in TilarAn in Guanacaste Province.29

However,

to put this burden in perspective and despite the obvious difference of
circumstance, one must remember that upwards of 60,000 Nicaraguan refugees
fled to Costa Rica during the worst fighting against the Somoza dictatorship
in early 1979.30

MID-TERM POLITICS: PRECANDIDACIES VERSUS THE "MAGIC FORMULA"
Although

most

Costa

Ricans consider presidential campaigns overly

lengthy, indeed that one has not ended before another begins, the major
national parties only began to gear up for the 1986 race in late 1983 and
early 1984.

If politics is indeed the national pastime, as the "ticos" claim,

then 1983 was its off-season.
The ruling National Liberation party and its President, Mr. Monge, have
maintained a fairly high degree of support despite the economic hard times.
Monge's favorable opinion index ( % positive minus % negative opinion) with the
public declined from 45 in March 1983, to 39 in July, to 37 in November, to 24
in March 1984, but he remained the second most popular among recent presidents
and active national politicians, largely owing to his handling of international affairs and his proclamation of Costa Rican neutrality.

More

importantly for the future, fully 44% of those surveyed considered themselves
Liberaci6n party supporters, compared to the 58% landslide won by the party in
the 1982 presidential election.

Although the announced Liberaci6n precandi-

dates each did poorly in a hypothetical 1986 race against the leading
opposition figure, Rafael Angel Calder6n Fournier, this was explainable in
part as owing to both lesser name recognition and in-party backlash opinion.
In any event, the margins were not insuperable since the differences were only

41-29, 41-27, and 37-26, with considerable numbers of uncommitted voters yet

to decide.3 1
Prior to any open politicking among those eligible to run in 1986, there
had been much ado within Liberaci6n circles regarding a so-called "magic
formula" to insure party victory in 1986 and reverse the thirty year pattern
of alternation in power by the party and its opposition.

This idea, floated

by the interested parties it appears, was to reform article 132 of the
national constitution to allow for presidential reelection, thus allowing the
highly popular Liberacibnista ex-presidents Jos6 Figueres and Daniel Oduber to
share an "invincible" ticket.
if

not

purpose.

Each of the leaders had previously supported,

orchestrated, attempts at

constitutional reform

for

just

this

Thus, the "magic formula" was seen as more fantasmographic than

novel and it failed miserably once again.

Figueres' advanced age and Oduber's

well known political ambitions counterbalanced their recognized talents in the
eyes of the party faithful, while its precandidates and those of the opposition had every reason to oppose any constitutional change.
Of the three ruling party candidates--Oscar Arias, Alberto Fait, and
Carlos Manuel Castillo--, the ~arty's Secretary General Arias appears to have
the inside track to the nomination, through his control of the party machinery
and the accumulation of past favors.

Indeed, of the three, Arias was both the

most popular within the party and the least successful in the hypothetical
race against the opposition leader.

Arias, thus, is not a figure likely to

excite either entrepreneurial interests within the party or a mass following
outside it.

A Ph.D.

graduate in Political Science in Britain and former

Minister of Planning (1974-1978),

as well as party legislative whip as deputy

(1978-19821, Arias comes from the leading provincial family of Jleredia.

His

style is extremely reserved and reflective, hardly the stuff for political
and should he win the nomination it will be owing

his "lid

support among mid-level party cadre rather than among the party's business or
popular supporters.

Arias resigned as Secretary in February 1984 in order to

campaign full time, as required by party statutes.

However, his machinery

within the party hierarchy remains fully intact and, at present, he appears to
have a substantial lead over his rivals.
Alberto Fait, Monge's

right hand as First Vice-President and a leader of

the pro-business wing of the party, will likely provide the most serious
competition for the nomination.

Fait took a leading role in Monge's

successful campaign for the nomination in 1982 and he has been particularly
influential on economic policy issues in the current administration.

He

appeals particularly to the party's wealthier segments and their support in
financing his precandidacy will give a major boost to his efforts.
The third official Liberaci6n precandidate is Carlos Manuel Castillo, the
man responsible for the minor miracle of exchange rate stabilization as head
of the Central Bank.

Before resigning in March 1984 to campaign full time,

Castillo had been one of the government's primary spokesmen on economic policy
and the renegotiation of the foreign debt.

Dr. Castillo, an internationally

renowned economist, lost to President Monge as a precandidate in the last race
and his current effort is generally regarded as a long shot at best.

The

party has, of course, officially prohibited open campaigning until a date has
been set for the early 1985 party nominating convention, but politicking
continues none the less.
The opposition, meanwhile, has expended its energies in reorganizing the
1978 and 1982 "Unidad" coalition format in search of both a new name and a
more solid ideological base capable of unifying them beyond the election
campaign itself.
Thus, Unidad was officially buried, to be replaced on
December 17, 1983 by the "Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC)-" This new

vehicle was made up of the same four opposition parties as before:
Cristiana (PDC),

Uni6n Popular (PUP),

Democracia

Renovaci6n Democrhtica (PRD),

and

Republican0 Calderonista (PRC), allegedly "fused" together in the new party.
While all are vaguely "Social-Christian" and slightly right of center, the
real popular strength remains concentrated in the PRC headed by 35 year old
Calder6n Fournier, son of the legendary Rafael Angel Calder6n Guardia who
founded the party while the reformist president in 1940-1944 and whose memory
yet today provokes strong feelings pro and con.

The younger Calder6n was

Foreign Minister (1978-1982) and ran unsuccessfully against Monge in 1982.

He

is considered by all observers as the virtually certain opposition candidate
in 1986, although a second loss might prove fatal to even this youthful
politician's chances of becoming president.
The PUSC is officially only 50% "calderonista" in its membership and
officialdom, leaving the other half to the three remaining parties.

Some

analysts have referred to this arrangement, half in jest, as one in which the
PRC provides the people, the PDC the ideology, the PRD the organizers, and the
PUP the money.

Of these latter three the PUP and PRD offer critical campaign

support, lapsing back into inactivity thereafter, while the PDC offers the
only minimally coherent doctrinary umbrella which might lead to an institutionalized, non-personalist opposition party.

At present they all take a back

seat to the "calderonista" faithful, in all likelihood as much as one-fifth or
more of the national electorate.
In June 1984 a date was to be set for the early 1985 opposition national
convention which would nominated a presidential candidate.

However, as has

usually been the case with the opposition, details were sketchy and while some
spoke of at least 4,000 delegates to a "National Assembly," it was not clear
whether this might not be a means of avoiding costly district level

conventions in the outlying areas of opposition weakness.

In any event, the

outcome did not appear in serious doubt.
While no competition had yet formally appeared on the horizon for
Calderbn, those rumored to be eyeing a bid were the presidents of the PRD,
Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, and the PDC, Jorge Arturo Zamora Monge, as well as
the ex-Labor Minister under Carazo, GermAn Serrano Pinto.

In reality, none of

these leaders could offer more than token opposition to Calder6n and it
remains to be seen which of them, if any, would be willing to risk even a
minimal campaign.

Aguilar, a forty year old University history professor, has

been the legislative whip of the opposition under the Monge administration,
while the fifty-five year old Zamora and his group make up in ideological
refinement what they lack in popular support.

In either case, no serious

prospects of victory exist for 1986 and any campaigning on their part would be
half-hearted, with a view toward perhaps distant future political goals.
Serrano,

so

closely

identified

in

the

public

mind

administration nightmare, stands even less of a chance.

with

the

Carazo

Indeed, the lack of

any credible challenge within his own party may be a mixed blessing for
Calder6n.

His candidacy may be assured, but maintaining general voter

interest throughout such a non-contest could be something of a problem later
in the general election. 32

NEW LEADERSHIP ON THE LEFT
Perhaps the most sensational political news of 1983 involved the smallest
party.

The pro-Moscow "Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)," leading partner of the

Left coalition People's

Unity (PU) which gained 3% of the 1982 presidential

vote and 4 of 57 national deputyships, suffered through a succession crisis of
major proportions at year's

end, the fallout from which has Yet to

settle.
The removal of Manuel Mora Valverde as Secretary General, and his
"elevation" to an honorific party presidency after 53 years at the party's
helm led

to repeated conflict from November on.

replacement

by

ex-deputy

Humberto

Vargas

The septegenarian's

Carbonell

was

initiated,

paradoxically, with the drafting of new party statutes at the btraordinary
Congress called by Mora himself for November 12-13.

The creation of a new

post of president, with which Mora concurred, set the stage for his own
removal.

December 3-4, at its 18th plenary session, the 35 member Central

Committee "overwhelmingly" accepted these changes and proceeded to replace
Mora with Vargas Carbonell and, ignoring Mora's protests, appointed him party
president.

However, this overwhelming majority was later reported by Mora

supporters to have been only a 20 to 15 vote. 33
Mora Valverde, who at the time was in Nicaragua, left shortly after the
early December vote for Cuba without making any official statement.

He did

send a letter to the party Central Committee in which he denounced the move,
resigned the presidency (as did his brother and party Undersecretary General
Eduardo),

and implied that hardliners and hotheads were employing a bureau-

cratic ruse to deprive him of the leadership which his popularity with the
party bases would reconfirm at the upcoming XIV Congress September 13-15,
1984.

Consultation with party militants by the new Secretary General

demonstrated a degree of hostility toward the move and support for Mora, which
led Vargas to travel to Cuba to meet with the latter in an unsuccessful
attempt to head off a public division of the party. 34
The major national media, in particular the conservative and stridently
anticommunist daily La Nacibn, repeatedly suggested, quoting various pro-Mora
party members, that the change represented the triumph of younger hardliners

disenchanted with what they considered a "soft and complacent" leadership and
exploiting both the creation of a new party presidency and the former
Secretary's advanced age to effect his removal.

An intriguing twist to this

interpretation was added by La Naci6n when its editorial analyst portrayed
Mora's

trip to Cuba, oddly enough, as an attempt to marshal1 the moderating

influence of Fidel Castro in his favor, against what he considers Sovietbacked advocates of anti-U.S.

armed adventurism throughout Central America.

Although Mora has been a faithful Soviet-line spokesman for half a century,
unlike Vargas he had no first-hand formative experience in that country and
was known to be working with both Castro and the Costa Rican government toward
a peace plan for Central America acceptable to the United States. 35
While Vargas may well represent somewhat more radical party elements, it
is equally clear that generational conflict alone might have led to such a
succession crisis.

Moreover, the support of the Central Committee majority,

"overwhelming" or not, and of the party's

legislative leader Arnoldo Ferreto

candidacy indicates something other than a simple "hardline"

for Vargas'
takeover.

Vargas played a leading role in party affairs as a deputy from 1978

to 1982.

He and Ferreto were largely ineffective in organizing strike

activities while deputies in this period, but Vargas was known as a serious
and capable legislator who played a major role in resolving problems of
university and public sector finance.

In any event, the only official party

statement in the affair was issued by Ferreto and claimed that there had been
no internal divisions, no change in policy, no reduction in Mora's powers, and
that tqe party was the victim of a difamatory publicity campaign which painted
it as dominated by "hardliners" advocating violence, thus justifying its
repression. 3 6
Mora returned from Cuba January 9, 1984 to a political gathering intended
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to demonstrate his continued popularity within the party.

However, successive

bids by his supporters to regain control of the party, or failing this hold a
rump convention and be recognized as the official PVP, were unsuccessful, with
the national Supreme Electoral Tribunal eventually ruling in favor of the
Vargas-Ferreto position.

Barring any reconciliation, difficult to imagine in

light of the accusations and recriminations already exchanged between the two
groups, the upcoming September party Congress promises to be an animated
affair indeed.

T ERROR1SM, POLITICS, AND THE "UNARMED" DEMOCRACY
Since 1981 there have been increasingly frequent terrorist attacks and
bombings in Costa Rica, most but not all carried out by Central American
political groups.

However, as these outbreaks have become more frequent, and

as local political differences became caught up in the Nicaraguan border war
or in crisis-spawned land invasions, the government began to respond by
beefing up' its no longer miniscule security forces.

Although having no

standing army (with fully 83% of the populace opposed to the creation of one),
Costa Rica has received some $2 million in U.S. arms aid each of the past two
years, and recently requested upwards of $10 million f m 1984.37
Security forces in Costa Rica have grown to include the following:
"5,000 Civil Guards, the main police force founded after the
1948 Civil War.

Since 1982, mobile Guard 'commands' have been

organized in strategic areas.

The newly formed Chorotega

Company, now stationed along the northern border, consists of
184 Guards trained by Costa Rican graduates of the U.S.
in the Panama Canal Zone.

school

The Southern Command and the

Atlantic Command, each with 278 guards, are based near the

banana plantations in southwestern and eastern Costa Rica.

...

There is also a 3,000 member Rural Guard (one of whose

main functions) is the eviction of peasant squatters.

The

Judicial Police (OIJ), founded in 1973 with 120 employees, now
has a total strength of 647, 287 of whom are investigators.

...

Other smaller security forces include the National

Security Agency

(ASN)

and

the

Intelligence and

Security

Directorate (DIS), consisting of some 100 officials

... ; the

Military Police, which has grown to 250 men from 100 in 1977
and

is

responsible

for

patrolling

specialized Crime Prevention Unit (UPD).

San

JosC;

and

the

The Organization for

National hergencies (OPEN) is a paramilitary group created by
presidential decree in 1982 whose 10,000 members receive four
hours training each week with obsolete Garand rifles.

The

stated aim of OPEN is to reinforce the Civil Guard in
emergencies, but ideology clearly plays an important part in
the organization.

Membership requirements include a 'proven

democratic creed' and, according to vice security minister
Johnny Campos, leftists are not permitted to join.

...

In

addition to the official security forces, private paramilitary
groups are also active. tr38
Two terrorist actions further inflamed local public opinion during
1983.

The late June dynamiting in San Jose of a car in which two Nicaraguan

citizens were killed and several on-lookers injured was widely reported to
have been a bungled attempt at assassinating the ant i-Sandinista leader
Alfonso Robelo, in coordination with Basque separatists of the ETA.

Later, in

October, the home of the British Ambassador in Costa Rifa was attacked9

allegedly by ETA militants with the possible collaboration of local fringe
elements on the Left.

By year's

end one local daily often known for its

sensationalism even claimed that a "communist training camp" for terrorists
was being operated in northern Costa Rica by North Korean and possible ETA
military personnel.39

Why such a shocking revelation should be relegated to a

minor notice near the sports pages was not explained, but may well have been
an indication that the story was based on something less than unimpeachable
sources.

Given this state of affairs it comes as no surprise that as early as

1982, in a poll commissioned by La Nacibn, some 54.2% of respondents felt
there was a link between "terrorists and domestic communist groups", without
any solid proof of such involvement having been presented by the government.4 0
While terrorist acts by exiles in San Josb provided the initial impetus
for the security buildup, these forces have become involved in other issues
and areas more directly since then.

Indeed, the relative ease with which

terrorist actions have been investigated and those responsible prosecuted
belies the need for vastly strengthened security forces.

In reality, these

forces are being expanded today to deal with two interrelated problems:

the

border conflict with Nicaragua and the increasingly frequent land invasions
throughout the countryside which are met with police force more often and more
violently than in the past.
The northern border issue will be dealt with more fully below, but the
Monge administration was clearly inclined to intervene more directly against
the contra camps on its border once death-squad style murders of leftist Costa
Rican citizens and burning and looting of stores owned by contra supporters
began there about mid-year. 41

The stationing of more security forces in the

region and the more active interdiction policy followed since late 1983 are
clearly part of the "neutrality" line espoused by the Monge administration.
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In this case, the security buildup appears, on the surface, to be aiding the
neutralist and Left cause.

However, major figures in the leadership of the

regular security forces, as well as the paramilitary OPEN system, in
particular Vice-Minister of Government and head of the Rural Guard, Enrique
Chacbn, are widely accused of collaboration with the contra forces led by EdCn
Pastora.

Major Liberaci6n leaders, such as Deputy Miguel Angel Guillen and

Minister of Public Security, Edmundo Solano Calderh, have denounced such
collaboration

as

inconsistent

with

the

administration's

professed

neutrality.42

Thus, the battle for control over the political role of the

growing security contingent on the northern border continues, despite overwhelming public opposition to the creation of a military force with political
influence internally.
As regards the Rural and Civil Guards and their role in expelling
squatters and repressing strikes in the banana plantation zones, little has
changed except the size of the problem and the levels of violence associated
with it.

For the first time in some years, a squatter was killed and several

injured in clashes with the Guard in the south of the country in early
1 9 8 4 . ~ ~Such an escalation of both the size of the security forces and their
use of lethal force bodes ill for the future of a regime no longer even
talking of a "return to the land" solution to the crisis.

COSTA RICA' S NEUTRALITY TIGHTROPE ACT
The Monge administration moved consistently after mid-1983 toward a more
effectively neutral position vis a vis the Nicraguan border fighting in
particular, and the Central American crisis in general.

This move was opposed

throughout by the United States and important Rightist elements within Costa
Rica, and even within the administration itself.

This opposition remains

formidable and determined, placing in doubt the eventual outlines of Costa
Rican foreign policy.

However, as we shall see below, each increase in the

pressure for an openly rightist, anti-Sandinista policy has led, on the
b

contrary, to an increased resistance to such a change in policy within
Liberacibn, in orchestration with a similar Mexican response to pressure from
the North.

Thus, the current State Department policy designed to push the

Monge administration off its "neutrality tightrope act" and into the U.S.Salvadoran-Honduran camp could well backfire as badly as similar plans to, in
effect, bribe Mexico with financial concessions in order to silence its
criticism of U.S. Central American policy.
The developments leading to Costa Rica's declaration of neutrality began
to appear after May 1983.

The high point of anti-Sandinista feeling within

Costa Rica had been reached in early March when, during Pope John Paul's visit
to Managua, he was poorly treated in his public appearance.

The Pope's use of

Costa Rica as his overnight base for several of: his one day visits to other,,
Central American capitals highlighted the "oasis of tranquility" image *Costa
Ricans are so fond of using in k

iqvidi>ous comparisons with their

neighbors,.and the conservative national press lost no time in portraying the
Managua debacle as proof of the noxious nature of Sandinismo.

However, the

administration's fears that the border war might eventually make a Lebanon of
Costa ~ i c a led
, ~ ~to a series of measures designed to rein in the contra
forces and distance Costa Rica from the Reagan administration line in Central
America.
The specific events which helped trigger the attempted crackdown were the
August airport bombing of Managua by a light plane thought initially to have
taken off from San Josd, the political killings and riot in Upala along the
border at this same time, and the early September contra attack on the P e Z s

Blancas border post.
arms

confiscated,

expelled. 45

Subsequently, ARDE fighters were regularly interned,
and

leaders

either

restrained

or,

occasionally,

Nevertheless, despite increased security forces on the border,

Costa Rica's capabilities against the contras are quite limited, basically to
harassment

and

dismanteling

of

communications facilities.

Of

greater

importance is the political shift which this policy implied for any future
insurgent or U.S.

plans for operations.

Indeed, some of the most highly

publicized internments and expulsions were of mercenaries (U.S.
Cuban-Americans)
sending

a

citizens and

recruited in Miami and in transit to the contra camps,

clear

if

hardly

definitive

message

to

these

nationals'

governments.4 6
Once this policy of effective neutrality had been adopted the immediate
implication was the necessity of a change of foreign ministers.

The then

Minister, Fernando Volio, had missed no opportunity to denounce the Sandinista
regime as totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist, expansionist, etc,

Indeed, his

rhetorical excesses were often an embarrassment for a regime attempting to
negotiate with Managua over border difficulties.

The similarity between

Volio's stridently expressed views and those of ex-party leader and ex-Foreign
Minister Gonzalo Facio, now a leading spokesman for rightist groups in Costa
Rica, was remarkable in light of the fact that the former purported to
represent an administration bitterly denounced by the latter.47
Volio's

imminent removal was indicated by informed sources as early as

August, while he chose to "resign" in November.

The earliest public signal of

this approaching change was President Monge's

trip to Mexico without his

foreign minister in mid-October.

While Monge denied there was any signifi-

cance in olio's absence, the Mexican press and officialdom correctly
The ostensible reason for olio's
understood the message being conveyed.18

eventual resignation was the United Nations vote cast against the U.S.
invasion of Grenada by Costa Rica's
instructions to him to abstain.

delegate, allegedly contrary to Volio's

However, the vote had been cast on orders

from the President himself, thus indicating that this resignation was indeed a
face-saving removal, but a removal none the less.
National Assembly voted to condemn the U.S.

At the same time, the

actions, implicitly lending

further support to Monge's change in foreign ministers. 49
Following upon this leadership change, Monge proceeded, on November 15th,
to formally declare Costa Rica's
documents section).50
Day

message,

permanent neutrality (transcribed in the

While first presented to the nation in an Independence

September

15th ,51

the

neutrality

proclamation

and

its

reaffirmation in November clearly were an attempt to lay to rest the Volio
period of confrontationism, and reflected a shift within the Cabinet and party
away from the U.S. sponsored line.
Two subsequent efforts were made by the U.S.

State Department, in

coordination with its controversial new ambassador in Costa Rica, Curtin
Winsor, to enlist the Monge administration in activities alternately termed
It

joint manuevers" and "regional development".

However, in both cases the

clumsiness of the approach has led not only to failure, but increased
opposition to such cooperation within the administration.
December a much publicized U.S.

In November and

offer of several hundred combat engineers to

build roads and bridges along the northern border was ultimately rejected by
Monge, who was then forced to ask that the ambassador clarify the issue of
11

joint manuevers" (Undersecretary Fred Ikle's overzealous characterization of

the

plan)

and

troop movements. 52

These difficulties were

repeatedly

compounded by the ambassador's proclivity for giving the Costa Rican government advice in public as to both long term solutions to its problems and
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current policy implementation.

This led to the Liberaci6n party directorate

rebuking him publicly for commenting on internal national affairs,53 while the
Left had already twice denounced his "interventionism.1154
Most recently, border clashes on May 3, 1984, in which Costa Rican
territory was reportedly shelled by the Sandinista army, led to a renewed
flurry of exchanges over possible requests for increased U.S.

military

Of far greater importance than the arms monies involved ($10 million

aid.55

per year for fiscal 1985, versus $2 million currently), the political gains
sought by the U.S.

were revealingly stated in a secret draft report as

follows:
It could lead to a significant shift from (Costa Rica's)
neutrality tightrope act, and push it more explicitly and
publicly into the anti-Sandinista camp.

This could pay

important political and diplomatic dividends for us. 1156
Although Costa Rican Foreign Minister Carlos JosQ Gutidrrez repeatedly denied
such a request had been made, or that any U.S.

pressure had been brought to

bear, the Mutual Radio Network quoted unnamed local political leaders to the
effect that the "pressure had increased ten-fold" on Costa Rica to support the
U.S.

line and accept military aid. 57

They also reported that this pressure

was leading to a major split with the ruling party.
Faced with greatly increased border tensions, and pressures both internally and externally, the opponents of Costa Rican militarization took to
the streets May 15th in a massive show of support for continued neutrality and
the Monge administration's
increased U.S.

steps ,'to implement it.58

Coincidentally, the

pressure came just as Mexican President De la Madrid made a

state visit to Washington, in which he boldly lectured the Reagan administration on the error of its ways in Central America.

In this context, the

Mexican-led Contadora group hurriedly put together an agreement, signed by the
foreign ministers of Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Panama, intended to prevent
further hostilities which might provide an excuse for heightened tensions or
any larger U. S. role in Costa Rica. 59

The publicity given during and after

the Mexican leader's visit to an alleged National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) 124, signed by President Reagan ordering the State Department to draw
up a diplomatic plan to pressure Mexico, through financial and

trade

concessions, into shifting its Central American policy seems likely to insure
the defeat of such an effort, not only with the Mexican leadership but even
with states like Costa Rica, more clearly clients of the U.S. to be sure, but
hardly without domestic critics of any policy too openly or slavishly
accommodationist.60
The byzantine character of contra infighting and

U.S.-Costa

Rican

relations regarding these forces was further highlighted by the foiled attempt
on the life of Ed&

Pastora, May 30, 1984, in which one U. S. and one Costa

Rican journalist and at least one guerrilla fighter were killed, while over
two dozen were injured.

Pastora's followers and the press initially suggested

that the attempt was the work of opponents of Pastora within ARDE (led by
Alfonso Robelo) who supported a U.S.

sponsored alliance of their group with

the Somocista-era contra forces of the Frente Democrbtico NicaragGense (FDN)
fighting along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Pastora's rejection of such an

alliance had angered bth Robelo and the CIA, principal advocates of such an
anti-Sandinista front strategy.

Subsequently, both Pastora and President

Monge implied that the Sandinista regime might have been. behind the attack,
which Managua vehemently denied.

Nevertheless, Monge ordered pas t o r a ' s arrest

while hospitalized and quickly deported him to Venezuela, this intended to
further prove Costa Rica's neutrality .61

While Costa Rican leaders welcomed the Kissinger Commission in October
1

1983, submitting grandiose requests for U.S.

assistance, experience since then

has soured a number of them on the prospects for U.S.

aid in the short run.

The likelihood of the commission's recommendations being funded seems far less
today than at the time of its visit to Costa Rica and, moreover, the price of
what assistance might be forthcoming is seen as too high politically and
diplo-matically by much of the ruling party, particularly its more youthful
elements.

If Costa Rica's economic stabilization and recovery remains caught

up in a tug of war with the IMF, then even more surely its political stability
is tied up with the Central American crisis and U. S. response.

Although the

internal dynamics of Costa Rican society tend toward compromise and stability,
the external economic and political contexts could well destroy such a nonviolent tradition.
well.

The ingredients for disaster exist in Costa Rica as

How well Costa Ricans deal with their increasingly limited options

remains to be seen, but if the recent past is any guide, caution and dialogue
are likely to be the fundamental weapons.

Whether they will prove to be

effective weapons to counter the militarization of regional life is yet an
open question.
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l e a d i n g t o t h e a t t a c k , see:

The Miami Herald, May 31, 1984, pp. 1, 27a.

l a t e r developments s e e The M i a m i Herald,
Times

9-

splits as

1 J u n e 1984, pp.

For

1, 8a; New York

1 June 1984, p. 1; The M i a m i Herald, 2 June 1984, p. l a .

TEXT OF CO STA RICAN NEUTRALTY STATUTE

"We declare that Costa Rica will observe neutrality in all
armed conflicts affecting the states of the international
community, subject to the following:
Active
Our neutrality does not imply impartiality in ideological
and

political conflicts in the world.

Costa

Rica has

maintained and will continue to maintain the political and
social concepts it shares with Western democracies.

This

neutrality will not prevent it from actively exercising its
rights as a member of the United Nations and the OAS in all
actions aimed at preserving international peace and security,
except those having military implications; at achieving a more
just social and economic system in relations among states; and
at the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Autonomous
Our neutrality is based on our sovereignty. Our country
does not recognize the right of any state to interpret the
consequences of this declaration of neutrality to determine,
define, or limit our country's foreign policy, either at the
United Nations and its agencies, at the OAS, or in bilateral
relations with other states.

We

ratify the obligations

imposed on us by international treaties and pacts that we have
signed, and we request that in the collective security systems
to which we belong we be freed from participating in military
actions, which we have not taken Part in for more than 30

36

years because we do not have an army.

Instead, in those

situations we have preferred to fulfill our duties through
humanitarian actions.
Qualified
We will not be neutral in the face of the states that are
guilty of aggression or against which the UN Security Council
issues preventive or coercive measures.

Neither will we be

neutral with regard to those who attack states to which we are
committed by virtue of regional collective security systems,
as provided by Article 53 of the UN Charter, or that exercise
the right to individual or collective defense, as provided by
Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Unarmed
Our

declaration of neutrality will

not

require the

reestablishment of the army as a permanent institution.
country's

The

external security will be based on the collective

security systems to which it belongs.
Permanent
Our neutrality does not refer to a particular conflict or
a specific region of the world.

Neither is it temporary.

We

hope that the decision adopted by the current government will
be maintained by those who succeed us.

For this purpose, we

are committed to struggle so that this principle, which we
feel

is

a

natural

development

of

Article

2

of

the

Constitution, will be expressly included in the country's
Constitution so that it will be permanent.
We also declare that our government knows and is ready

f u l l f i l l t h e d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n i n v o l v e s
i n accordance w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, d o c t r i n e , and custom.
On b e h a l f

of

the

Costa Rican p e o p l e ,

w e make known t h i s

d e c l a r a t i o n t o a l l t h e member s t a t e s of
community.

the international

We w i l l be g r a t e f u l i f t h e y , on t h e i r o w n b e h a l f ,

decide t o recognize, support, o r guarantee t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n .
I s s u e d i n San J o s e , Costa Rica on 1 5 September 1983, 162d
a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e proclamation of o u r independence."
[Signed] Costa Rican P r e s i d e n t Luis A l b e r t o Monge

Source:
Radio R e l o j , San J o s 6 , 15 September 1983; ( F o r e i g n
Broadcast I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , 16 September 1983, pp. 1-4.)

